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Coleridge and Problems of Lexicography
Yoshiki NAKAMURA
Introduction
Engaged in a grand project of Encyclopaedia Metropolitana (-, 
 vols.) as its leading designer, Samuel Taylor Coleridge wrote the 
“Prospectus” to it in  and an article titled “Treatise on Method” in 
the succeeding year, which was later included in Metropolitana as “the 
General Introduction”. They give an important perspective on what an 
encyclopaedia and a classification of sciences should be, according to the 
Platonism he adopts as “an universal Method by which every step in our 
progress through the whole circle of art and science should be directed [. . 
.] in the very interior and central essence of the human intellect.” (“Treatise 
on Method”, Shorter Works and Fragments I, 0) The period when he 
worked on Metropolitana (-) saw the flourish of the materialistic 
culture of dictionaries and encyclopaedias; among others, the fifth edition 
of Encyclopaedia Britannica (, 20 vols.) and Abraham Rees’ The New 
Cyclopaedia, which was about to reach its completion (02-20,  vols.), 
acquired general and continued currency. For Coleridge, who had been 
planning an encyclopaedia at least as early as 0 (Letters II, -), the 
supervising of Metropolitana must have been a once-for-all opportunity 
to involve his long-cherished idea of organizing philosophy and philology 
with the cultural campaign of his contemporary time, and especially to 
triumph over the materialistic emphasis on external facts which French 
L’Encyclopédie and the two encyclopaedias cited above represented, by 
the vision of the organic development of human intellect. 
But, as far as Coleridge was concerned, the project ended with the 
breakdown of the collaborative task with its publisher because of his 
bankruptcy and Coleridge’s early withdrawal from it. The irony here 
is, therefore, that the importance of him in the materialistic history of 
lexicography follows not from any substantial fruition (he didn’t make any 
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more contribution to the Metropolitana than those two articles) but only 
from the ideal(istic) model of an ecyclopaedia he called for. In its head of 
“encyclopaedia”, the current Britannica describes Metropolitana as “an 
impressive failure, [whose] ideas for it had a lasting influence” (vol. , 2) 
and “[w]hat might have been the greatest encyclopaedia of the century” (2), 
and Coleridge as making “the most notable contribution to the philosophy 
of encyclopaedia making since Bacon” with “Treatise on Method” (2, 
italics mine). 
Then his idea of an encyclopaedia should not be considered so much 
in relation to any real encyclopaedic material as to the pattern of thought 
he models on the metaphor of an encyclopaedia. This abstraction is fully 
verified by Coleridge himself, for “An Essay on a Principle of Method” (), 
a revised version of “Treatise on Method”, omits reference to the design of 
Metropolitana, focusing solely on the abstracted Platonic method of seeking 
for unified principle of knowledge, despite of much of the passages from 
“Treatise on Method” being repeated verbatim. This process of “editing” 
the former article suggests that it is in practice as much as in theory 
that the idea of lexicography grasped his mind. In short, though there 
have been many times when he came up with the idea of producing a 
dictionary or an encyclopaedia, we would soon understand that this idea is 
an inevitable consequence led out by his interest in philosophical methods 
of dealing with encyclopaedic materials like words, ideas, and sciences.
Hence this paper will proceed with the following questions; if it is 
true that his philosophy of lexicography made a path to the history of 
dictionary making), what method of thinking in practice is it that gave a 
ground to this idea and motivated him toward it? Or what “lexicographical 
problems” are latent in his texts as having to do with the blueprint of 
Platonism outlined in “Treatise on Method”? Here we might well expand 
the concept of lexicography as a hypothetical device with which to 
measure the nature, method, and even failure, of his theory of language 
and critical thinking by this theory in general―concerning, for example, 
what cognitive path for truth language might be expected to open, what 
kind of nomenclature would be needed for constructing and editing an 
organic philosophy, and so on. This approach will not only enable us to 
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reread Coleridge’s various texts in terms of formal aspects of his language 
and of the way he uses language, but also, by way of lexicography as a 
frame of reference, will be quite useful to reconsider the historical location 
of Coleridge’s speculative activities; although they are generally seen in the 
history of ideas as traces in the transitive phase of European philosophy 
between Materialism and Idealism around the turn of the century 
(often by assuming a solid opposition of these two ideologies), Coleridge’
s Idealism2) cannot be understood without the method he took in coping 
with lexicographical materials he had been absorbing from his early time). 
So we will be faced with another question that seems a bit paradoxical, “how 
could he formulate the Platonism of unified knowledge in the very sphere 
concerning materialistic problems?”
With these interests, I will first look at some occasions when 
the idea of producing a dictionary (an equivalent to an ecyclopaedia) 
comes to Coleridge’s mind, focusing on its philosophical program for the 
sophistication of human intellect, and also on some problems resulting 
from his linguistic manipulation of “desynonymization”) as a methodical, 
not substantial, step for that program. Second, I will discuss, in terms of 
making use of his own encyclopaedic learning, how his prose is structured 
to embody a lexicographical pattern of thought. My aim therein is to attest 
that there is a paradox between practice and theory in Coleridge’s text, 
which tends to put his philosophy into fragmentation and digression, and 
that it is this paradox that indicates historical and personal difficulties in 
attempting to set up a paradigmatic method which would be intended to 
overcome and regulate materialistic philosophy. 
1. “A Philosophical Dictionary”
If the history of lexicography reflected that of one polemical issue 
ever bothering and yet-unresolved―whether a dictionary should be 
prescriptive or descriptive, or to use A. W. Read’s expression, whether it 
should be “the type of the ‘academy’s dictionary’, in which the vocabulary 
consists of ‘good words’ only, supported perhaps by quotations from 
‘reputable authors’” or “the historical type, best represented by the Oxford 
English Dictionary, in which the history of words is set forth objectively” 
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(Read, 2)―then Coleridge’s way of committing himself to lexicography 
would be understood within that problem area. For instance, his peculiar 
estimation of Francis Bacon as “the British Plato” in “Treatise on Method” 
() is one answer to that issue from a philosophical perspective; despite 
of the conventional view that Bacon is the initiator of empiricism based 
on observation and experiment of particular sensory data, Coleridge 
reinterprets him to be the Platonic figure who had an arduous attitude 
of seeking for an organic and holistic set of truths), thus seeing him 
an embodiment, through such works as The Advancement of Learning 
(0), of prescriptive and systematic knowledge in lexicography. Thus 
Bacon serves as a spiritual basis for Metropolitana’s way of refuting the 
French L’Encyclopédie which he thinks constitutes a mechanical, arbitrary 
arrangement of sensory objects (2). 
But it is quite inadequate to point out the difference between French 
Encyclopaedists and Coleridge who tries to place himself in line with the 
history of Platonism inherited by Bacon, because d’Alembert, for example, 
frankly acknowledges Bacon’s great influence on the method of classifying 
sciences in L’Encyclopédie, though with a slight critical modification 
of his arrangement (the Introduction to L’Encyclopédie,00). What is 
needed to distinguish Coleridge from the Encyclopaedists and even from 
Bacon is therefore to consider what type of method he adopts in editing 
encyclopaedic materials, a clue to which seems to be detected not in what 
he conceptually manifests but in the occasion when he is motivated by an 
actual need of making encyclopaedias or dictionaries. 
Let us start with a passage from Biographia Literaria (), for 
it typically contains a germinal awareness of lexicography in him. In 
the passage, saying that “[t]here is a philosophic [. . .] consciousness 
possessed by a few chosen philosophers which would govern all reflective 
beings”, Coleridge makes a distinction between “transcendental” and 
“transcendent” according to Kant (Biographia, I, 2), the former of which 
should be appropriated to the mind of such true philosophers. This 
“desynonymization”, however, doesn’t lead him to further speculation of 
the condition of human cognitive faculties as Kant did by these terms, 
but to slip into a digressive footnote where he begins to reflect upon the 
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historical reception of these terms, and even claims for the impending 
need of an English dictionary ever unpublished which would comprehend 
the history of the whole language:
This distinction between transcendent and transcendental 
is observed by our elder divines and philosophers, wherever 
they express themselves scholastically. Dr. Johnson indeed has 
confounded the two words; but his own authorities do not bear him 
out. Of this celebrated dictionary I will venture to remark once for 
all, that I should respect the man of a morose disposition who should 
speak of it without respect and gratitude as a most instructive and 
entertaining book, and hitherto, unfortunately, an indispensable 
book; but I confess, that I should be surpirzed at hearing from a 
philosophic and thorough scholar any but very qualified praises of it, 
as a dictionary. [. . .]
     Were I asked, what I deemed the greatest and most unmixt 
benefit, which a wealthy individual, or an association of wealthy 
individuals could bestow on their country and on mankind, I should 
not hesitate to answer, “a philosophical English dictionary; with the 
Greek, Latin, German, French, Spanish, and Italian synonimes, and 
with correspondent indexes.” (Biographia, I, 2-n)
The passage exposes an evidential moment when the method of 
desynonymization serves as an indispensable tool to make a “philosophical”, 
sophisticated nomenclature. The nomenclature is required to be 
authoritative for the sake of a “philosophical” reflection on that language, 
but if such a “philosophical” nature of a dictionary can be vindicated 
by its total inclusion of the vicissitudes of their actual use (in relation 
to “Greek, Latin, French, Spanish, and Italian synonimes”), it follows 
that the descriptive method might lead to the prescriptive, Platonically 
comprehensive state of the dictionary. What is idiosyncratic to Coleridge 
is his self-referential focusing on a “transcendental” consciousness in light 
of lexicography; although the state of being “transcendental” is supposed 
to be the kernel of human intellect, it also acts as a trigger of the idea 
of the philosophical dictionary by becoming just one of the entries it 
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would include. Thus a philosophical consciousness can be understood 
just by agency of the philological nature of the term concerned. That’
s why, in a lecture of philosophy, he declares that “[a]ll our knowledge 
may be well comprised in two terms. The one is philology, [. . .] in which 
he has a desire of arriving at that which the Logos or intellectual power 
can communicate; the other is philosophy, or that which comprises the 
Logos, and including it, at the same time subordinates it to the Will, 
and thus combining with the other, is philosophy, the love of wisdom 
with the wisdom of love” (Philosophical Lecture, II, ), and also that’
s why, in another occasion, which begins with a pedagogical remark on 
desynonymization―“[t]here are few pursuits more instructive and not 
many more entertaining, I own, than that of retracing the progress of 
a living language for a few centuries, and its improvement as an organ 
and a vehicle of thought by desynonymising words”―he explicates “the 
duty of a philosopher” as furthering “the progress of language” with “new 
distinctions” (Lectures of Philosophy, II, -). So, for instance, he criticized 
Hobbes’ confusion between “compelled” and “obliged” for the description of 
moral responsibility, for the former suggests nothing more than the forced 
state of “must” in a mechanistic sense, whether one likes it or not, while 
the latter describes its inner truth as voluntary moral impetus like “ought 
to” (Lectures of Philosophy, I, 2). 
Seen from a wider epistemological point of view, such a philological 
task of desynonymization charged with philosophical functions gives a 
concrete shape to the way of grasping the world and the whole human 
intellect as they should be, which the following passage professes well:
The whole of the progress of the society might be expressed in a 
dictionary; [. . .] there would arise a motive for giving a term for each 
as warning ad safeguard; and the whole of the progress of society, as 
far as it is human society, depends upon, it may sound as a paradox 
but it is still a very serious truth, the process of desynonymising [. . .]. 
(Lectures of Philosophy. I, 22)
The metaphor of a dictionary (or a book) for the world has been traditional 
Coleridge and Problems of Lexicography 2
since the Bible as a world-image made by God, marking its climax in 
the French Enlightenment with its embodiment by L’Encyclopédie, 
Coleridge carries this idea out by use of philology and etymology), and, 
very peculiarly, justifies it with the support of Plato as an early claimer 
of the importance of an encyclopaedia; in the following passage, where he 
praises Plato and Speusippus, his direct successor, who became “the first 
man who attempted an encyclopaedia in the genuine sense of the word, 
that is, a coorganisation of the sciences as so many [inter]independent 
systems, each having a specific life of its own but all communicating with 
philosophy as the common centre [. . .] by means of a philosophic logic 
as the great sympathetic nerves leading to it (2). This is just where 
Coleridge’s ideological position of Platonism / Idealism is sustained by 
his lexicographical scholarship under academic purposes , almost getting 
closer to what Paul Hamilton calls the “philosophical programme full 
of Enlightenment optimism” (Hamilton, ). His application of philology 
becomes obvious in Metropolitana; though it was intended to embody the 
“coorganisation of the sciences” by a unifying “philosophic logic”, Coleridge 
“beg[s] to call the reader’s attention to” its fourth (last) section, for it 
contains “Alphabetical, Miscellaneous, and Supplementary [materials], [. . .] 
and a Philosophical and Etymological LEXICON of the English Language” 
(the Prospectus to Metropolitana, Shorter Works and Fragments, I, -), 
whose features he says are “distinguishing [. . .] and perfectly original” 
among other encyclopaedias because of its treatment of “the history of 
such applications of each word in the chronological arrangement of the 
authorities cited”(). Such an inclusion of accidental, historical changes of 
words in its scope seems to reflect Coleridge’s edifying purpose by means 
of the living nature of words and ideas.
A philosophical dictionary he proposes, if we imagined as really 
issued, however, would surely expose ambiguity with regard to how the 
desynonymization, apt to be conceptual and arbitrary, could come to terms 
with the positivistic handling of words as historical materials. In short, 
philosophy and philology remains unbridged. Even studies on etymology, 
though usually required to be evidence-based and descriptive enough, 
is granted its importance by him only in its possible effects of enacting 
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hidden truths, and hence sometimes lapses into a self-indulgent pedantry 
in which his serious speculative activity on words becomes difficult to tell 
from a mere wordplay. An example of this is his tracing the meaning of 
“think” back to that of “thing” which is etymologically not correct at all. 
To think absolutely or indefinitely is impossible, for a finite mind 
at least. To think [. . .] is to thingify. Thing = the Ing, a word found 
either separately or in the terminations of all the Gothic Dialects, is a 
somewhat set apart―thus Ingle = the Hearth. (Letter, IV, )
His erudition and imaginative wit allows him to say that the act of 
thinking is rooted in “thing”, by whose forcibly associated imagery of an 
“ingle” he justifies the Kantian idea that to think is not to see something 
naked but to see it through a categorical form of experience of things like 
seeing fire in a hearth (ingle). Thus his “philosophical” emphasis on the 
history of words seems to be self-contradictory, disclosing such a conflict 
of lexicons as between the state of being purely given data and that of 
being under subjective choice and manipulation. True that he never parts 
with philological materials due to their possibilities of revealing themselves 
to be “living Words” (Aids to Reflection, . See also Statesman’s Manual, 
2), but their miscellaneous nature and his arbitrary handling of them are 
definitely on the verge of producing only a mass of debris to fall from the 
Platonic construction of knowledge. 
2. Practice of Self-Knowledge: “Nominalistic Reduction”
Here we need to make sure that the lexicographical problems 
appear just in Coleridge’s own studies on words, not in any actual form 
of dictionary. This suggests that it is not sufficient to understand the 
nature of Coleridge’s idea of lexicography from the side of its theoretical 
formula, what is at more actual issue is to see his attitude toward words 
as materials and his routine exercise of reflecting upon them in his texts. 
In this section, I will take two steps for considering some aspects of 
his lexicographical concerns in practice; first, to delineate the way his 
philosophical postulate “self-knowledge” or “self-reflection” (the key concept 
which noticeably enables Coleridge to make a “philosophical” defense, or 
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guise, for his activities, following Plato and Schelling with the imperative of 
the ancient Delphic dictum, “Know Thyself!” (Biographia, I, 22) is carried 
out in his texts, its role being in fact a technical, rather than idealistic, one. 
Second, I will ascribe such a performative self-reflection to his obsessive 
tendency to reduce, or condense, philosophical ideas into particular 
nomenclatural indexes, characterizing it as “nominalistic reduction”. 
Coleridge well understands that human intellect can hardly exerts “Reason”, 
the faculty of intuitively getting to the essential divine truths, and what 
usually works is instead “Understanding”, the faculty of “generalizing the 
notices received from the Senses in order to the construction of Name: of 
referring particular notices (i.e. impressions or sensations) to their proper 
name” (Aids, 22), which yet remains delusive because of its dependence 
on empirical forms of truth rather than on the truth itself (2). So if “the 
nominalistic reduction” pervades over his texts, it becomes very critical to 
him because it is only performed in a digressive place like notes, indexes, 
parenthesis, or marginalia; we will find out that, despite of his pragmatic 
application of nomenclature, just as if the act of thinking were to consult 
an imaginary “transcendental” dictionary as a tool, this method is just 
what makes his texts stagnant by indulgence in jumbles of words, with his 
professed Platonism being in danger of lapsing into materialism.
It is worth considering that just in the period around which 
Coleridge took part in Metropolitana he also attempted to absorb the 
knowledge of German Idealism into his own. Biographia Literaria (), 
a monumental work for this attempt, introduces a dynamic philosophy as 
the first principle of both human spirit and external nature, from which 
the poetic imagination can be deduced. We can hence regard Biographia 
as aiming to give a philosophical premise to the scientific, encyclopaedic 
mind presented in “Treatise on Method”. In order to demonstrate that 
the unity of being and knowing, or “the coincidence of an object with a 
subject” (Biographia, I, 22), much of whose ideas being owed to Schelling 
though, he expounds the unity with a concept of “self-consciousness”; 
it “is the fixt point, to which for us all is morticed and annexed, [. . .] 
may be the modification of a higher form of being, perhaps of a higher 
consciousness, [. . .]; in short, self-consciousness may be itself something 
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explicable into something, which must lie beyond the possibility of our 
knowledge, because the whole synthesis of our intelligence is first formed 
in and through the self-consciousness” (Biographia, I, 2-). Apart from 
its conceptual qualities which he explains as intuitively revealed by some 
divine medium (“the heaven-descended”, 22), however, it remains unclear 
how this consciousness can work out. A later work, Aids to Reflection (2) 
recommends readers to perform self-consciousness in a clearer, more 
practical manner, as a deed of reflecting on the nature and limit of human 
knowledge, the most significant object of it being language:
Self-knowledge is the key to this casket; and by reflection alone can 
it be obtained. Reflect on your own thoughts, actions, circumstances, 
and [. . .] accustom yourself to reflect on the words you use, hear, 
or read, their birth, derivation and history. For if words are not 
THINGS, they are LIVING POWERS, by which the things of most 
importance to mankind are actuated, combined, and humanized. (Aids 
to Reflection, 0)
As long as self-consciousness is to be realized by understanding the 
nature of words―no less than cognitive media through which one can 
pierce into the objects they represent―lots of Coleridge’s texts are found 
to be sites where this consciousness becomes manifest. I would like to 
show three distinct examples to illustrate it, in all of which the “nominalistic 
reduction” characteristically takes place. The first is Statesman’s Manual 
(); with persistent criticism on French materialism which, in his view, 
distorted the terminology of what he calls “old philosophy”, the book 
professes an alternative organic philosophy based on the intuitive and 
imaginative power of human mind. But he says in a passage, “whoever 
should have the hardihood to reproclaim its solemn Truths must commence 
[of the old philosophy] with a Glossary” (Statesman’s Manual, ), and indeed 
concludes the work with “a nomenclature of the principal terms that occur 
in the elements of speculative philosophy, in their old and rightful sense, 
according to my belief” (Statesman’s Manual, ), enumerating special 
terms like “sensation”, “perception”, “intuition”, “idea”, and so on, to give 
them enough prescriptive definitions to support his philosophy. The second 
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is Biographia Literaria, whose first volume is at first aimed to make “the 
applications of the rules, deduced from philosophical principles, to poetry 
and criticism” (Biographia, I, ), but in fact focusing on desynonymizing 
imagination from fancy, impatiently abandons the demonstration of “the 
first philosophy” ever performed, and ends with nominal definitions of 
these two faculties (Biographia, I, 0-). Hence the first volume can be 
regarded as a kind of a huge footnote to give a self-conscious criterion 
on terms which are to be applied to the literary criticism in the second 
volume. The last is the desynonymization of Reason and Understanding 
in Aids to Reflection (2), which serves as a fulcrum of the main theme; 
though the work thematically attempts verification of the mystery of 
Christian doctrines by a defense that “the CHRISTIAN FAITH [. . .] 
IS THE PERFECTION OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE”, its method is 
“[t]o direct the Reader’s attention to the value of the Science of Words, 
their use and abuse [. . .] (Aids, ), for he believes the confusion of terms 
threatens to make people fall into “sophistry”, the Sin of human intellect. 
(Aids, ) Therefore a distinction of Reason, the faculty of intuiting the 
divine truth, and Understanding, the faculty of grasping objects of sense 
through conceptual forms, is the most crucial task for clarifying the 
boundary between faith and knowledge. Here again, the theological issues 
are moulded in nominal forms, except for which there will be no path to 
the essence of Christianity. All of these examples well suggest that they 
presupposes a lexicographical form within their structure apparently as a 
procedure modeled after the experience of referring to a dictionary for the 
insight into the topics in question. 
What might be noted is that his working on words generally 
becomes more spontaneous, imaginative, or sometimes obsessive in spaces 
where subsidiary reflections, whimsical associations, or irresponsible 
joking, are freely done, than in such writings as might require him to do 
tightly logical arguments. Coleridge once said, “I converse better than 
compose, and write better letters than essays” (quoted in Willey, 22), and 
it is in those slackened spaces that, Owen Barfield analyzes, the punning 
and funning becomes a decisive spur on his writing energy; in his letters, 
“[h]owever low those spirits [of his], and perhaps at their very lowest pint 
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Coleridge always felt up to having a lark with a word”, whose frequent 
occurrence is “refreshing to the reader, as no doubt it was refreshing to 
him”.(Barfield, 20) But of course it doesn’t mean that his indulgence in 
words is limited to private writings; as John Beer remarks, not only his 
“intellectual activity [. . .] spills rapidly into notebooks and letters” but 
even “it tends rather to be siphoned off into footnotes and appendixes”
(Beer, ) whose general function is to reconsider, define, or tinker with, 
the assumptions of topics or the terms used for them. Thence we might 
answer the question put by W. V. Harris about “the authority to be given 
to unpublished material and thus the limits of its legitimate use” (Harris, 
), by saying that it is of great importance to see out of the whole of his 
texts a recurring pattern which conditions and effectuates his intellectual 
occupation through nominalistic reduction, whether philosophical or 
jesting, whether in public or private writings, or whether in texts and 
subtexts. What pervades his writings is more often a heuristic method 
through nominal index than an organized procedure of logical arguments; 
heuristic because, as the three examples above imply, it is the act of 
defining, or reflecting on words that offers an approach to philosophy even 
without being given a theoretical foundation.
Then we are led, in this time at the level of his practical method, 
to a crucial paradox. Though the nominalistic reduction aims toward 
Platonic revelation of a word into the Word, it is generally apt to work 
out in a marginal, digressive space of his texts. To use Coleridge’s favorite 
terms in a different context, his thoughts are driven by “centripetal” 
and “centrifugal” forces at the same time (Biographia, I, 2). It is not 
that the one force is in operation while the other is at halt, but the 
Platonic centripetality in the pursuit of the essence of a word is found in 
his incidental, long-excursive footnotes and other associated spaces. Of 
Coleridge’s notebooks Seamus Perry puts this tendency in a succinct way; 
“[t]o ‘feel too intensely the omnipresence of all in each’ is to be exercised 
by a persistent equivocation between the apprehensions of diversity 
and unity; the claim of unity lead to a kind of inclusiveness, a principled 
form of copiousness; while the pull of diversity means that individual 
elements of the resulting plenitude are always ready to become items of 
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imaginative interest in their own right. (Perry, ) “The pull of diversity” 
leads Coleridge to get indulged in digression where his philological interest 
might display itself to the full, and nevertheless this indulgence would be 
justified by the formulae Platonic “omnipresence of all in each”, or “self-
consciousness” by which the subject gets into the heart of the object he is 
engaged in. 
This double-oriented strain of his texts is also implicit in the 
metaphor of “cement”, which he often uses favorably in his articles 
to express a method of binding particular ideas and sciences from a 
unifying standpoint. “Treatise on Method” claims for the importance of 
the “ subtile, cementing, subterraneous’ power” of human intellect (0, 
italics mine) required for an encyclopaedia, and Biographia applies the 
image to illustrate the Kantian a priori categories for experiences; “[h]ow 
can we make bricks without straw? Or build without cement? We learn 
all things indeed by occasion of experience; but the very facts so learnt 
force us inward on the antecedents, that must be pre-supposed in order to 
render experience itself possible” (Biographia, I, 2). Yet, while serving as 
a fundamental principle of knowledge which gives each of experiences a 
unified form, the cement is also applied to make a rhetorical defense for a 
jumbled-up mass of his discussion; during the time of writing The Friend 
(), a miscellaneous collection of essay, it was the fragmented and long-
winding style of his prose that was a most worrying matter not only to his 
readers but to Coleridge himself; his prose is, he admits, “an entortillage 
in the sentences & even the thoughts”, and a “stately piling up of Story 
on Story in one architectural period, which is not suited to a periodical 
Essay”.(Letter, III, 2) In The Friend he justifies the piling and winding 
architecture of his prose in comparison to “the stately march and difficult 
evolutions, which characterize the eloquence of” the seventeenth century 
writers he admires like “Hooker, Bacon, Milton, and Jeremy Taylor 
[who] are, notwithstanding their intrinsic excellence, still less suited to a 
periodical Essay”. His claims here is that these writers are possessed with 
“all the cement of thought” (Friend, I, 20) while the French epigrammatic, 
or we can even say materialistic, style fatally lacks it because the clarity 
and palpability of its sentences give readers “the habit of receiving 
0
pleasure without any exertion of thought, by the mere excitement of 
curiosity and sensibility” (20). 
In this way the material metaphor of cement gives us a clue to a 
system which is supposed to pierce through, but in fact is dependent 
on, a bundle of his miscellaneous, winding ideas which really constitute 
it. Cement is an inevitable agency for the whole of various parts to be 
united, but it is after all no more than a means, or an aid to reflection, 
given only qualities that are material and subsidiary to the main body of 
the architecture. This exemplifies the paradox above; the more obsessively 
self-reflective Coleridge becomes with “the cement of thought” in pursuit 
for the organic unity of knowledge, the clearer the excess of its material, 
digressive characters turns out. His etymological studies, intermissive 
punning on words, and even the fourth section of Metropolitana which as 
he planned consists of massive philological data―all of these therefore 
can be read as documents to show the strange coexistence between 
Platonism and Materialism, centripetality and centrifugality, unity and 
digression, and so forth. 
Conclusion
What could we lead out in reading the way Coleridge’s texts are 
constructed or edited in the framework of lexicography? Their historical 
peculiarity seems to lie in his tumbling in the abstraction of a methodical 
form out of materialistic objects, trying to extend its scope to the general 
method of searching for truth. In this sense we should not see his approach 
to constructing unified knowledge as a profession of total Idealism 
radically cut off from Materialism; much material occasions are found in 
his texts, and in this sense his Idealism can be found only in the process 
of his abstracting a “method”, by which, in spite of its originally pragmatic 
sense, he seems to mean a universal laws for a wide range of sciences that 
is so generalizing and comprehensive that it might lose its specific objects 
and hence become “spiritual” or “philosophical”. But after all a method for 
what? In “Treatise on Method” Coleridge goes as far as to say that it is a 
method for “a principle of UNITY WITH PROGRESSION” (0), but this 
in fact reveals the very moment when it becomes metaphysical enough to 
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repress Coleridge’s own actual method for materialistic problems. I have 
so far attempted, by seeing philological materials as they are in the very 
process and failure of abstraction by Coleridge’s own hand, to clarify such 
a strain in the structure of his texts at work within the epistemological 
boundary of his contemporary conceptual debates. If we are to see a series 
of Coleridge’s texts, and failed Metropolitana as well, symptomatic of such 
epistemological aspects, then we can locate him as a significant figure who 
embodies the nodal point where his personal intellectual propensity, the 
paradigmatic frictions in philosophy, and also those in lexicography, are 
converged with one another. 
Notes
)　James McKusick sees his organic notion of the history of language 
as preparing the “ideological climate that provided the OED with the 
rationale and cultural authority.” (McKusick 2, 22)
2)　“Platonism” would be a better term for its wide and implicit meaning, 
and my later discussion will often use this term in behalf of “Idealism”. 
)　See McKusick’s detailed description of his philological learning 
through Horne Tooke and Göttingen University. (MuKusick , -)
)　“Desynonymization” is the term Coleridge coined himself for the act of 
dividing and redefining two terms that have been used confusingly. Its 
first appearance is in Biographia, I, 2.
)　Coleridge’s Bacon as an embodiment of Platonism is formulated by 
his following remark: “With him, therefore, as with us, an idea is, an 
experiment proposed, an experiment is an idea realized.” (“Treatise on 
Method, )
)　See his belief that “[t]here are cases, in which more knowledge of 
more value may be conveyed by the history of a word, than by the 
history of a campaign.” (Aids, n)
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